When Managers Bypass Shareholder Approval of Board Appointments: Evidence from the Private Security Market

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2005

• Venue

  Social Science Research Network

• Publication date

  2005-12-29

• Fields of study

  Business, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.04.001
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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