Merger efficiency and managerial incentives

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2015

• Venue

  International Journal of Industrial Organization

• Publication date

  2015-07-01

• Fields of study

  Business, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/J.IJINDORG.2015.05.004
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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