We show that banks' risk exposure in one asset category affects how they report regulatory risk weights for another asset category. Specifically, banks report lower credit risk weights for their loan portfolio when they face higher risk exposure in their trading book. This relationship is especially strong for banks that have binding regulatory capital constraints. Our results suggest the existence of incentive spillovers across different risk categories. We relate this behavior to the discretion inherent in internal ratings-based models which these banks use to assess risk. These findings imply that supervision should include a comprehensive view of different bank risk dimensions.
A comprehensive view on risk reporting: Evidence from supervisory data
Puriya Abbassi,Michael Schmidt
Published 2018 in Journal of Financial Intermediation
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2018
- Venue
Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Publication date
2018-10-01
- Fields of study
Business, Economics
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
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