The Roles of Empathy and Anger in the Regulation of Third-Party Punishment

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• Publication year

  2012

• Venue

  Unknown venue

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• Fields of study

  Law, Psychology

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• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

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  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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