Inductions, Red Herrings, and the Best Explanation for the Mixed Record of Science

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2010

• Venue

  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

• Publication date

  2010-12-01

• Fields of study

  Philosophy

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1093/bjps/axq004
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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