In many developing countries, households can purchase limited quantities of goods at a fixed subsidized price through ration shops. This paper asks whether the characteristics of developing countries explain why governments use such systems. I find an equity-efficiency trade-off: an efficiency-maximizing government will never use ration shops, but a welfare-maximizing one might to redistribute and provide insurance. Welfare gains of ration shops will be highest for necessity goods and goods with high price risk. I calibrate the model for India and find that ration shops are welfare improving for three of the four goods sold through the system today. (JEL D12, H23, H25, O12)
Can Rationing Increase Welfare? Theory and an Application to India’s Ration Shop System
Published 2018 in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
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- Publication year
2018
- Venue
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publication date
2018-09-27
- Fields of study
Business, Economics
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Semantic Scholar
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