On the Impossibility of Fair Risk Allocation

P. Csóka,Miklós Pintér

Published 2010 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

ABSTRACT

Abstract Allocating risk properly to subunits is crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying simultaneously the natural game theoretical requirements of Core Compatibility and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games as being the only risk allocation method satisfying Strong Monotonicity, Equal Treatment Property and Efficiency. Moreover, we clarify and interpret the related game theoretical requirements that have appeared in the literature so far and have been applied to risk allocation.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2010

  • Venue

    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

  • Publication date

    Unknown publication date

  • Fields of study

    Mathematics, Economics

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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