Abstract Allocating risk properly to subunits is crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying simultaneously the natural game theoretical requirements of Core Compatibility and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games as being the only risk allocation method satisfying Strong Monotonicity, Equal Treatment Property and Efficiency. Moreover, we clarify and interpret the related game theoretical requirements that have appeared in the literature so far and have been applied to risk allocation.
On the Impossibility of Fair Risk Allocation
Published 2010 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2010
- Venue
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Publication date
Unknown publication date
- Fields of study
Mathematics, Economics
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-45 of 45 references · Page 1 of 1
CITED BY
Showing 1-54 of 54 citing papers · Page 1 of 1