Revealed time preference

P. Dziewulski

Published 2014 in Games Econ. Behav.

ABSTRACT

Consider an experiment in which subjects are asked to choose between pairs consisting of a monetary payment and a time-delay at which the payment is delivered. Given a finite set of observations, under what conditions the choices of an individual agent can be rationalised by a discounted utility function? We develop an axiomatic characterisation of time-preference with various forms of discounting, including weakly present-biased, quasi-hyperbolic, and exponential, and determine the testable restrictions for each specification. Moreover, we discuss identification issues which may arise in this class of experiments.

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