We study the effects of communication content and its interaction with reputation on the choice of transaction partners in markets with moral hazard. We find that buyers' choices of sellers are influenced by prices and reputation information as well as by sellers' messages: buyers prefer sellers who make specific promises. If specific promises are infeasible, buyers prefer sellers whose arguments reduce the social distance. These observations do not depend on the availability of reputation information. We also find that, if specific promises are feasible, buyers' profits do not significantly differ from hypothetical profits realized under a correct expectations rule.
The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners: A study based on field and laboratory data
Jeannette E. Brosig-Koch,Timo Heinrich
Published 2018 in Games Econ. Behav.
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- Publication year
2018
- Venue
Games Econ. Behav.
- Publication date
2018-11-01
- Fields of study
Business, Computer Science, Economics
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Semantic Scholar
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