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A Theory of Political Entrenchment

G. Saint‐Paul,Davide Ticchi,A. Vindigni

Published 2016 in Social Science Research Network

ABSTRACT

Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2016

  • Venue

    Social Science Research Network

  • Publication date

    2016-06-01

  • Fields of study

    Economics, Political Science

  • Identifiers
    DOI 10.1111/ECOJ.12215
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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