Small Coalitions Cannot Manipulate Voting

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2005

• Venue

  Financial Cryptography

• Publication date

  2005-02-28

• Fields of study

  Computer Science, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/11507840_25
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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