In this work we present the first passive attack over the SASI lightweight authentication protocol with modular rotations. This can be used to fully recover the secret ID of the RFID tag, which is the value the protocol is designed to conceal. The attack is described initially for recovering ⌊log2(96)⌋ = 6 bits of the secret value ID, a result that by itself allows to mount traceability attacks on any given tag. However, the proposed scheme can be extended to obtain any amount of bits of the secret ID, provided a sufficiently large number of successful consecutive sessions are eavesdropped. We also present results on the attack’s efficiency, and some ideas to secure this version of the SASI protocol.
Cryptanalysis of the SASI Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol with Modular Rotations
J. Castro,Juan E. Tapiador,Pedro Peris-López,J. Quisquater
Published 2008 in arXiv.org
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- Publication year
2008
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arXiv.org
- Publication date
2008-11-26
- Fields of study
Computer Science
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