AGENCY VS. STEWARDSHIP: PERFORMANCE, STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY AND RISK

With taxpayers subsidizing the survival of publicly traded firms, questions of corporate governance, including the steward versus agency design of the firm, are now public policy issues. We use publicly traded insurance firms in the United States to study the value and risk relationship of agency versus stewardship firms. We find that stewardship and agency firms have different timing-related performance perspectives, have different degrees of strategic flexibility, and manage short term, or operational risk, and longer term risk differently. Our findings are consistent with the predictions of corporate governance theory.

• Publication year

  2010

• Venue

  Corporate Ownership and Control

• Publication date

  Unknown publication date

• Fields of study

  Business, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.22495/COCV7I3C2P1
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• Reinsurance and corporate taxation in the United Kingdom life insurance industry

  2008cited by this paper
• The Impact of Cash Flow Volatility on Systematic Risk

  2008cited by this paper
• The impact of business environment and boards of directors on strategic decision-making: A case study of Greek listed companies

  2008cited by this paper
• Long-run risk-return trade-offs

  2008cited by this paper
• Financial Constraints, Competition, and Hedging in Industry Equilibrium

  2007cited by this paper
• Internal Versus External Capital Markets in the Insurance Industry: The Role of Reinsurance

  2007cited by this paper
• Exploring Contextual Variations in Land Use and Transport Analysis Using a Probit Model with Geographical Weights

  2006influential reference
• Principal‐agent relationships on the stewardship‐agency axis

  2006cited by this paper
• How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial Structure?

  2005cited by this paper
• Corporate Governance, Family Ownership and Firm Value: The Canadian Evidence

  2005influential reference
• Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness

  2004cited by this paper
• Self–Serving or Self–Actualizing? Models of Man and Agency Costs in Different Types of Family Firms: A Commentary on “Comparing the Agency Costs of Family and Non–family Firms: Conceptual Issues and Exploratory Evidence”

  2004cited by this paper
• Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of Governance

  2003influential reference
• Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives ?

  2001cited by this paper
• A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control

  2001cited by this paper
• Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers

  1999cited by this paper
• Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression

  1998cited by this paper
• TOWARD A STEWARDSHIP THEORY OF MANAGEMENT

  1997cited by this paper
• CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: WHAT'S THE FUSS?

  1996cited by this paper
• Life Insurer Financial Distress: Classification Models and Empirical Evidence

  1995cited by this paper
• CEO Duality as a Double-Edged Sword: How Boards of Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command

  1994cited by this paper
• The control hypothesis and recurring versus accumulated free cash flow

  1993cited by this paper
• The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies

  1992cited by this paper
• The corporate board: confronting the paradoxes.

  1992cited by this paper
• CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis

  1991cited by this paper
• Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns

  1991influential reference
• Managerial domination of boards of directors and financial performance

  1988influential reference
• CORPORATE BOARD SIZE, COMPOSITION AND CORPORATE FAILURES IN RETAILING INDUSTRY[1]

  1985cited by this paper
• The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences

  1985cited by this paper
• Ownership structure and control: The mutualization of stock life insurance companies☆

  1984cited by this paper
• Theory of the Firm

  1976cited by this paper
• A Model of the “Managerial” Enterprise

  1963cited by this paper
• journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf

  year unknowncited by this paper

• No citing papers are available for this paper.