Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2019

• Venue

  Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

• Publication date

  2019-05-08

• Fields of study

  Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/s10458-020-09469-4
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent

  2018cited by this paper
• Strategic Signaling and Free Information Disclosure in Auctions

  2017cited by this paper
• The Benefit in Free Information Disclosure When Selling Information to People

  2017cited by this paper
• Selective opportunity disclosure at the service of strategic information platforms

  2017cited by this paper
• Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

  2017cited by this paper
• Game Theory for Data Science: Eliciting Truthful Information

  2017influential reference
• An Information Theoretic Framework For Designing Information Elicitation Mechanisms That Reward Truth-telling

  2016cited by this paper
• Incentives for Effort in Crowdsourcing Using the Peer Truth Serum

  2016cited by this paper
• Strategic Free Information Disclosure for Search-Based Information Platforms

  2015cited by this paper
• Strategy-Proof and Efficient Kidney Exchange Using a Credit Mechanism

  2015cited by this paper
• Strategic Free Information Disclosure for a Vickrey Auction

  2015cited by this paper
• Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification

  2014cited by this paper
• Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization

  2014cited by this paper
• Manipulating Information Providers Access to Information in Auctions

  2014cited by this paper
• The Binarized Scoring Rule

  2013cited by this paper
• Information Elicitation sans Verification

  2013cited by this paper
• Creating Truth-Telling Incentives with the Bayesian Truth Serum

  2013cited by this paper
• On the Choice of Obtaining and Disclosing the Commonvalue in Auctions

  2012cited by this paper
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items

  2012cited by this paper
• A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations

  2012cited by this paper
• Optimal mechanisms for selling information

  2012cited by this paper
• Multi-attribute mate choice decisions and uncertainty in the decision process: a generalized sequential search strategy

  2010cited by this paper
• Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging

  2010cited by this paper
• A penny for your thoughts: Inducing truth-telling in stated preference elicitation

  2010cited by this paper
• A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes*

  2009cited by this paper
• A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes

  2009cited by this paper
• Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly

  2007cited by this paper
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

  2004cited by this paper
• A Bayesian Truth Serum for Subjective Data

  2004cited by this paper
• THE OPTIMALL EVELOF EXPERIMENTATION

  2001cited by this paper
• Information acquisition in auctions

  2000cited by this paper
• The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment

  1999cited by this paper
• Goethe's Second‐Price Auction

  1998cited by this paper
• AUCTIONS FOR OIL AND GAS LEASES WITH AN INFORMED BIDDER AND A RANDOM RESERVATION PRICE

  1994cited by this paper
• Optimal Selling Strategies for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Buyer

  1993cited by this paper
• A common value auction model with endogenous entry and information acquisition

  1993cited by this paper
• The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions

  1992cited by this paper
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design

  1986cited by this paper
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

  1982influential reference
• The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality

  1981cited by this paper
• Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications

  1981cited by this paper
• Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids

  1980cited by this paper
• Optimal search for the best alternative

  1978cited by this paper
• Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders

  1961cited by this paper

• Costly information providing in binary contests

  2024cites this paper
• Strategic Signaling for Selling Information Goods

  2019cites this paper