The Use of Coercion in Society: Insecure Property Rights, Conflict, and Economic Backwardness

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2011

• Venue

  Unknown venue

• Publication date

  2011-09-09

• Fields of study

  Law, Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780195392777.013.0026
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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