In this article, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is, to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks on actuator and sensor signals, in the presence of stochastic process and measurement noise signals. We model the systems under attack as hidden mode stochastic switched linear systems with unknown inputs and propose the use of a multiple-model inference algorithm to tackle these security issues. Moreover, we characterize fundamental limitations to resilient estimation (e.g., upper bound on the number of tolerable signal attacks) and discuss the topics of attack detection, identification, and mitigation under this framework. Simulation examples of switching and false data injection attacks on a benchmark system and an IEEE 68-bus test system show the efficacy of our approach to recover resilient (i.e., asymptotically unbiased) state estimates as well as to identify and mitigate the attacks.
Switching and Data Injection Attacks on Stochastic Cyber-Physical Systems
Sze Zheng Yong,Minghui Zhu,Emilio Frazzoli
Published 2017 in ACM Trans. Cyber Phys. Syst.
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- Publication year
2017
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ACM Trans. Cyber Phys. Syst.
- Publication date
2017-07-22
- Fields of study
Mathematics, Computer Science, Engineering
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