Quantile Stable Mechanisms

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

• Publication year

  2015

• Venue

  Games

• Publication date

  2015-04-01

• Fields of study

  Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.2139/SSRN.2526505
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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