This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.
Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
Filip Matejka,Guido Tabellini,Guido Tabellini
Published 2020 in Journal of the European Economic Association
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- Publication year
2020
- Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publication date
2020-09-23
- Fields of study
Economics, Political Science
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Semantic Scholar
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