Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters

Filip Matejka,Guido Tabellini,Guido Tabellini

Published 2020 in Journal of the European Economic Association

ABSTRACT

This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2020

  • Venue

    Journal of the European Economic Association

  • Publication date

    2020-09-23

  • Fields of study

    Economics, Political Science

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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