Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2008

• Venue

  Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money

• Publication date

  2008-02-01

• Fields of study

  Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/J.INTFIN.2006.06.001
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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