We examine the working mechanisms and efficiencies of zoning (regulation of floor area ratios and land-use types) and fiscal instruments (tolls, property taxes, and income transfer), and extend the instrument choice theory to include the congestion of road and nonroad infrastructure. We show that in the spatial model with heterogeneous households the standard first-best instruments do not work because they trigger distortion of spatial allocations. In addition, because of the household heterogeneity and real estate market distortions, zoning could be less efficient than, as efficient as, or more efficient than pricing instruments. However, when the zoning enacted deviates from the optimum, zoning not only becomes inferior to congestion charges but is also likely to reduce welfare. In addition, we provide a global platform that extends the instrument choice theory of pollution control to include various types of externalities and a wide range of discrete policy deviations for any reasons beyond cost–benefit uncertainties. JEL classification: H21; R52
Regulation versus Taxation: Efficiency of Zoning and Tax Instruments as Anti-Congestion Policies
Published 2022 in Journal of Housing Economics
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- Publication year
2022
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Journal of Housing Economics
- Publication date
2022-02-01
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