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Persuading part of an audience

Bruno Salcedo

Published 2019 in arXiv: Theoretical Economics

ABSTRACT

I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I find that senders can gain credibility by speaking truthfully to some receivers while lying to others. In general settings, the model admits information transmission in equilibrium for some prior beliefs. The sender can approximate her preferred outcome when the fraction of the audience she needs to persuade is sufficiently small. I characterize the sender-optimal equilibrium and the benefit of not having to persuade your whole audience in separable environments. I also analyze different applications and verify that the results are robust to some perturbations of the model, including non-transparent motives as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), and full commitment as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2019

  • Venue

    arXiv: Theoretical Economics

  • Publication date

    2019-02-28

  • Fields of study

    Computer Science, Economics

  • Identifiers
    arXiv 1903.00129
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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