Gig Economy: A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2019

• Venue

  arXiv: General Economics

• Publication date

  2019-02-26

• Fields of study

  Economics

• Identifiers

  No identifiers available.

• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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