I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.
Deception as cooperation.
Published 2019 in Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences
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- Publication year
2019
- Venue
Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences
- Publication date
2019-07-17
- Fields of study
Biology, Medicine, Philosophy, History
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- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar, PubMed
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