The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment and monitoring activities. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Utility levels of employed workers and welfare recipients may increase even if the net wage declines. The utility differential between these two groups of workers shrinks.
Workfare, Monitoring, and Efficiency Wages
C. Holzner,V. Meier,M. Werding
Published 2010 in Social Science Research Network
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- Publication year
2010
- Venue
Social Science Research Network
- Publication date
2010-03-01
- Fields of study
Economics
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Semantic Scholar
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