Escaping the Repugnant Conclusion: Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism with Variable Population

We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how RDCLU avoids serious objections raised against other variable population criteria. In particular, it escapes both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Very Sadistic Conclusion (one of which critical-level generalized utilitarianism fails for any critical level).

• Publication year

  2014

• Venue

  Social Science Research Network

• Publication date

  2014-09-01

• Fields of study

  Philosophy, Economics, Environmental Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.3982/TE1338
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• Probability Adjusted Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism

  2014cited by this paper
• Justifying social discounting: The rank-discounted utilitarian approach

  2012cited by this paper
• The most important thing about climate change

  2010cited by this paper
• Intergenerational Equity

  2009influential reference
• A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies

  2009cited by this paper
• Population issues in social choice theory, welfare economics and ethics

  2005cited by this paper
• Regarding Optimum Population

  2005cited by this paper
• Population Principles with Number-Dependent Critical Levels

  2002cited by this paper
• Future generations : A challenge for moral theory

  2000influential reference
• Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics

  1998cited by this paper
• Leximin population ethics.

  1996cited by this paper
• Intertemporal population ethics: critical-level utilitarian principles.

  1995influential reference
• Utilitarian tradeoff between population growth and income growth

  1995cited by this paper
• Optimal population size and endogenous growth.

  1993cited by this paper
• Might theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value

  1991cited by this paper
• What Should We Do About Future Generations?

  1989cited by this paper
• Progressive taxation and redistributive taxation: Different labels for the same product?

  1988cited by this paper
• Measurement of inequality: An attempt at unification and generalization

  1988influential reference
• Lives and well-being

  1988cited by this paper
• Social criteria for evaluating population change

  1984cited by this paper
• Reasons and Persons

  1984cited by this paper
• Future Generations: Further Problems

  1982cited by this paper
• The Structure of Utility Functions

  1968cited by this paper

• Growth and adaptation to climate change in the long run

  2025cites this paper
• Utilitarianism or egalitarianism? A new characterization of the mixed utilitarian-maximin social welfare orderings

  2024cites this paper
• Optimal longevity of a dynasty

  2024cites this paper
• What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests

  2024cites this paper
• Non-Archimedean population axiologies

  2024cites this paper
• A simple and general axiomatization of average utility maximization for infinite streams

  2024cites this paper
• Climate, technology, family size; on the crossroad between two ultimate externalities

  2023cites this paper
• Utilitarianism is Implied by Social and Individual Dominance

  2023cites this paper
• The Sum of Averages: An Egyptology-Proof Average View

  2023cites this paper
• A new result on the impossibility of avoiding both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions

  2023cites this paper
• Opposite ethical views converge under the threat of catastrophic climate change

  2023cites this paper
• Population ethics under risk

  2023cites this paper
• Calibrating variable-value population ethics: Implications for the effort to avoid the repugnant

  2022cites this paper
• Fair Allocations in an Overlapping Generations Economy

  2022cites this paper
• Infinite Population Utilitarian Criteria

  2022cites this paper
• Intragenerational Inequality Aversion and Intergenerational Equity

  2022cites this paper
• Foundations of utilitarianism under risk and variable population

  2022cites this paper
• Calibration dilemmas in the ethics of distribution

  2022cites this paper
• Utilitarianism on the front lines: COVID-19, public ethics, and the “hidden assumption” problem

  2022influential citation
• Thresholds, critical levels, and generalized sufficientarian principles

  2022cites this paper
• Revisiting variable-value population principles

  2022influential citation
• Repugnant conclusions

  2021cites this paper
• Average Utilitarianism Implies Solipsistic Egoism

  2021cites this paper
• Anonymity and Non-Identity Cases

  2021cites this paper
• Additively-separable and rank-discounted variable-population social welfare functions: A characterization.

  2021cites this paper
• Population Ethics and the Prospects for Fertility Policy as Climate Mitigation Policy

  2021cites this paper
• Average Utilitarianism Implies Solipsistic Egoism

  2021cites this paper
• Catastrophic climate change, population ethics and intergenerational equity

  2020cites this paper
• Epistemic repugnance four ways

  2020cites this paper
• Intergenerational Social Welfare Evaluation with Variable Population Size

  2020cites this paper
• Mere Addition is equivalent to avoiding the Sadistic Conclusion in all plausible variable-population social orderings.

  2020cites this paper
• Non-Additive Axiologies in Large Worlds

  2020cites this paper
• The utilitarian–maximin social welfare function and anomalies in social choice

  2020influential citation
• Why Variable-Population Social Orderings Cannot Escape the Repugnant Conclusion: Proofs and Implications

  2019cites this paper
• Can a Growing World be Fed when the Climate is Changing?

  2019influential citation
• Rank-additive population ethics

  2019cites this paper
• Social Discounting and Intergenerational Pareto

  2018influential citation
• Welfare economics, risk and uncertainty

  2018cites this paper
• The Social Cost of Carbon: Valuing Inequality, Risk, and Population for Climate Policy

  2018cites this paper
• Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics

  2018cites this paper
• Population-Adjusted Egalitarianism

  2018influential citation
• Interdependencies between intra and intragenerational equity in sustainable environemental resources management

  2018cites this paper
• Why the Repugnant Conclusion is Inescapable

  2018cites this paper
• Intergenerational equity under catastrophic climate change

  2017cites this paper
• Social Discounting and Long-Run Discounting

  2017influential citation
• Infinite-horizon critical-level leximin principles : Axiomatizations and some general results ∗

  2017cites this paper
• Wealth and population growth under dynamic average utilitarianism

  2017cites this paper
• Ethique de la population : l'apport des critères de bien-être dépendant du rang

  2016cites this paper
• Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size

  2016cites this paper
• Sustainable growth

  2016cites this paper
• Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size

  2016cites this paper
• Evaluating Intergenerational Risks: Probabillity Adjusted Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism

  2015influential citation
• Discounting, risk and inequality: A general approach

  2015cites this paper
• Probability Adjusted Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism

  2014cites this paper
• Egalitarianism under population change: age structure does matter

  2014cites this paper
• Population ethics with thresholds

  year unknowncites this paper
• Ex-Post Average Utilitarianism Can Be Worse for All Affected, even if No Contingently Existing Person Is Affected

  year unknowncites this paper
• What Forms for Incomplete Population Ethics Does Social Expected Multi-Utility Permit?

  year unknowncites this paper