A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Non-Transferable Utility Game

It is well--known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (1970) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non--empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the pi -balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufficient non--emptiness of the core.

• Publication year

  2002

• Venue

  Journal of Economics Theory

• Publication date

  2002-07-01

• Fields of study

  Physics, Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.2139/ssrn.319062
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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