Price (in Bayes, 1958) introduced Bayes's theorem as a precise and accurate method for measuring the strength of an inductive argument. He contrasted Bayesian reasoning with common sense, which, he argued, is imbued with vagueness and often erroneous. Nearly two centuries later, Price's claim was put to the test by psychologists who examined how people revise their opinions in light of new evidence (e.g., Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). For the past four decades, scholars have debated whether common sense can or cannot approximate Bayesian reasoning.
Beyond getting the numbers right: what does it mean to be a “successful” Bayesian reasoner?
G. Vallée-Tourangeau,M. Sirota,Marie Juanchich,F. Vallée‐Tourangeau
Published 2015 in Frontiers in Psychology
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- Publication year
2015
- Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
- Publication date
2015-06-02
- Fields of study
Medicine, Philosophy, Psychology
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar, PubMed
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