Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

• Publication year

  2015

• Venue

  Theoretical Economics

• Publication date

  2015-09-01

• Fields of study

  Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.3982/TE1362
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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