{"corpus_id":53793399,"paper_sha":"37c5964ac9fc3cf3dad02369f219a084db7f67f2","doi":"10.1177/1465116506063706","arxiv_id":null,"pmid":null,"pmcid":null,"mag_id":2099919319,"dblp_id":null,"acl_id":null,"title":"Are there Political Budget Cycles in the Euro Area?","year":2006,"publication_date":"2006-05-08","venue":"","journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","pages":"191 - 211","volume":"7"},"journal_issn":null,"journal_title":null,"publication_types":["JournalArticle"],"pubmed_pub_types":null,"s2_fields_of_study":["Economics","Political Science"],"reference_count":46,"citation_count":155,"influential_citation_count":4,"is_open_access":true,"arxiv_categories":null,"arxiv_license":null,"arxiv_journal_ref":null,"mesh_headings":null,"chemicals":null,"comments_corrections":null,"source_flags":1,"s2_open_access_pdf_url":"https://hal.science/hal-00571724/file/PEER_stage2_10.1177%252F1465116506063706.pdf","s2_open_access_landing_url":"https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/37c5964ac9fc3cf3dad02369f219a084db7f67f2","s2_open_access_license":"other-oa","s2_open_access_status":"GREEN","pmc_open_access_pdf_url":null,"pmc_open_access_landing_url":null,"pmc_open_access_license":null,"pmc_open_access_status":null,"unpaywall_open_access_pdf_url":null,"unpaywall_open_access_landing_url":null,"unpaywall_open_access_license":null,"unpaywall_open_access_status":null,"abstract":"This article examines whether there is a political budget cycle (PBC) in countries in the euro area. Using a multivari ate model for 1999–2004 and various election indicators we find strong evidence that, since the start of the Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal policy-makers in the euro area have pursued expansionary policies before elections. In an elec tion year – but not in the year prior to the election – the budget deficit increases. This result is in line with third-generation PBC models, which are based on moral hazard. We also find a significant but small partisan effect on fiscal policy outcomes.","claims":[{"public_id":"cl_a8a1bebd8c3c0edce7e89dd7f84be343","status":"active","text":"A significant but small partisan effect is present in fiscal policy outcomes.","confidence":0.91,"contributors":[{"id":1,"public_id":"12632b8b5f","public_label":"Anonymous (12632b8b5f)","roles":["extraction"],"url":"https://sah.borca.ai/u/12632b8b5f"}],"url":"https://sah.borca.ai/claims/cl_a8a1bebd8c3c0edce7e89dd7f84be343"},{"public_id":"cl_e1f8219bc58cf58f31c6fb10646cbe68","status":"active","text":"Strong evidence indicates that fiscal policy-makers in the euro area pursued expansionary policies before elections after the start of the Stability and Growth Pact.","confidence":0.97,"contributors":[{"id":1,"public_id":"12632b8b5f","public_label":"Anonymous 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