False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad

Is it always wise to disclose good news? We find that the worst sender with good news has the most incentive to disclose it, so reporting good news can paradoxically make the sender look bad. If the good news is attainable by sufficiently mediocre types, or if the sender is already expected to be of a relatively high type, withholding good news is an equilibrium. Since the sender has a legitimate fear of looking too anxious to reveal good news, having a third party disclose the news, or mandating that the sender disclose the news, can help the sender. The predictions are tested by examining when economics faculty at different institutions use titles such as "Dr" and "Professor" in voicemail greetings and course syllabi.

• Publication year

  2020

• Venue

  Journal of Mathematical Economics

• Publication date

  2020-03-01

• Fields of study

  Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.10.004
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• Silence is Safest: Non-Disclosure When the Audience's Preferences are Uncertain

  2019cited by this paper
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure

  2019cited by this paper
• The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds

  2018cited by this paper
• Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling

  2018cited by this paper
• Coarse Grades: Informing the Public by Withholding Information

  2018cited by this paper
• Mixed signals: Charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income

  2017cited by this paper
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

  2017cited by this paper
• Overeagerness

  2016cited by this paper
• Price Discrimination with Demarketing

  2016cited by this paper
• Untangling Searchable and Experiential Quality Responses to Counterfeits

  2015cited by this paper
• Strategic Disclosure: The Case of Business School Rankings

  2015cited by this paper
• Inconspicuous Conspicuous Consumption

  2015cited by this paper
• Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes

  2014cited by this paper
• Market signaling with grades

  2014cited by this paper
• Persuasion and learning by countersignaling

  2013cited by this paper
• How Category Reporting Can Improve Fundraising

  2013cited by this paper
• (De)marketing to Manage Consumer Quality Inferences

  2013cited by this paper
• Laws and Norms

  2012cited by this paper
• Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution? Evidence from India’s Green Rating Project

  2011cited by this paper
• Low Quality as a Signal of High Quality

  2011cited by this paper
• Developing a Reputation for Reticence

  2011cited by this paper
• Label Confusion: The Groucho Effect of Uncertain Standards

  2011cited by this paper
• Uninformative Advertising as an Invitation to Search

  2011cited by this paper
• Is quality accreditation effective? Evidence from the childcare market

  2010cited by this paper
• Communication with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

  2009cited by this paper
• Quality Disclosure and Competition

  2009cited by this paper
• Will There Be Blood? Incentives and Substitution Effects in Pro-Social Behavior

  2009cited by this paper
• Signaling Games

  2009cited by this paper
• econstor Make Your Publications Visible . A Service of zbw

  2008cited by this paper
• Stochastic Orders

  2008cited by this paper
• Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling

  2008cited by this paper
• Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion

  2008cited by this paper
• Selective and Aggregate Disclosure

  2008cited by this paper
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence

  2007cited by this paper
• A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling

  2007cited by this paper
• Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige

  2006cited by this paper
• Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

  2006cited by this paper
• Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure Under Threat of Audit

  2006cited by this paper
• The Groucho Effect of Uncertain Standards

  2006cited by this paper
• Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory

  2006cited by this paper
• Strategic dropouts

  2005cited by this paper
• Critical Values for the Robust Rank-Order Test

  2005cited by this paper
• Look How Little I'm Advertising! ∗

  2005cited by this paper
• Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments

  2005cited by this paper
• Competition and disclosure incentives: an empirical study of HMOs.

  2005cited by this paper
• Voluntary Disclosure of Partially Verifiable Information

  2004cited by this paper
• Log-concave probability and its applications

  2004cited by this paper
• A MODEL OF MIXED SIGNALS WITH APPLICATIONS TO COUNTERSIGNALING AND THE GED1

  2004cited by this paper
• Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention

  2004cited by this paper
• The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards

  2003cited by this paper
• Education and the Allocation of Talent

  2003cited by this paper
• Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

  2003cited by this paper
• Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets

  2002cited by this paper
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty

  2002cited by this paper
• Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of Prestige

  2002cited by this paper
• Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling

  2002cited by this paper
• Disclosure to a Credulous Audience: The Role of Limited Attention

  2002cited by this paper
• Modest Advertising Signals Strength

  2002cited by this paper
• Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes

  2001cited by this paper
• Disclosures and asset returns

  2001cited by this paper
• Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts

  2001cited by this paper
• Middle‐Status Conformity: Theoretical Restatement and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets1

  2001cited by this paper
• The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market*

  2000cited by this paper
• Investor Sophistication and Voluntary Disclosures

  1999cited by this paper
• Information revelation and certification intermediaries

  1999cited by this paper
• Supermodularity and Complementarity

  1998cited by this paper
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages

  1997cited by this paper
• D1 Signaling Equilibria with Multiple Signals and a Continuum of Types

  1996cited by this paper
• Information Transmission When the Informed Party Is Confused

  1996cited by this paper
• A Simple Model of Educational Standards

  1994cited by this paper
• News Management and the Value of Firms

  1994cited by this paper
• Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games

  1993cited by this paper
• Games and information: An introduction to game theory: Eric Rasmusen, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989)

  1991cited by this paper
• Non-disclosure and Adverse Disclosure as Signals of Firm Value

  1990cited by this paper
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

  1990cited by this paper
• Information quality and discretionary disclosure

  1990cited by this paper
• Strategic Information Revelation

  1990cited by this paper
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

  1987cited by this paper
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

  1987cited by this paper
• Proprietary and Nonproprietary Disclosures

  1986cited by this paper
• DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATION

  1985cited by this paper
• Voluntary disclosure : robustness of the unraveling result, and comments on its importance

  1985cited by this paper
• Relying on the Information of Interested Parties

  1985cited by this paper
• Planning Under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect.

  1985cited by this paper
• Truthful Disclosure of Information

  1982cited by this paper
• STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION

  1982cited by this paper
• A theory of auctions and competitive bidding

  1982cited by this paper
• Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications

  1981influential reference
• The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality

  1981cited by this paper
• Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids

  1980cited by this paper
• A Note on "Lemons" Markets with Quality Certification

  1978cited by this paper
• The theory of the leisure class : an economic study of institutions

  year unknowncited by this paper
• Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Social Image Concerns and Prosocial Behavior: Field Evidence from a Nonlinear Incentive Scheme

  year unknowncited by this paper

• Financial Judicial Specialization and Corporate Information Interaction: Evidence from the Establishment of Financial Courts in China

  2025cites this paper
• Bayesian Persuasion

  2024cites this paper
• Black Box Credit Scoring and Data Sharing

  2024cites this paper
• The Reputational Benefits of Intellectual Humility

  2023cites this paper
• Effects of corporate governance disclosure on profitability of public listed firms in Tanzania

  2022cites this paper
• Silence is safest: Information disclosure when the audience’s preferences are uncertain

  2021cites this paper
• Unravelling Theory: Strategic (Non-) Disclosure of Online Ratings

  2021cites this paper
• Incentives to (not) disclose energy performance information in the housing market

  2020cites this paper
• Silence is Safest: Non-Disclosure When the Audience's Preferences are Uncertain

  2019cites this paper
• Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information

  2018cites this paper
• Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship

  2018cites this paper