Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.
Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games
Jeremy T. Fox,Chenyu Yang,David H. Hsu
Published 2018 in Journal of Political Economy
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- Publication year
2018
- Venue
Journal of Political Economy
- Publication date
2018-07-03
- Fields of study
Computer Science, Economics, Political Science
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