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An Empirical Model of the Medical Match.

N. Agarwal

Published 2015 in The American Economic Review

ABSTRACT

This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries.

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