We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and correlated values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. In a two-period case all equilibria with private offers have more trade than any equilibrium with public offers; under some additional conditions we show Pareto-dominance of the private-offers equilibria. If a failure to trade by the deadline results in an efficiency loss, public offers can induce a market breakdown before the deadline, while trade never stops with private offers.
Transparency and Distressed Sales Under Asymmetric Information
William Fuchs,Aniko Oery,Andrzej Skrzypacz
Published 2015 in Theoretical Economics
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- Publication year
2015
- Venue
Theoretical Economics
- Publication date
2015-02-10
- Fields of study
Business, Economics
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