Transparency and Distressed Sales Under Asymmetric Information

William Fuchs,Aniko Oery,Andrzej Skrzypacz

Published 2015 in Theoretical Economics

ABSTRACT

We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and correlated values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. In a two-period case all equilibria with private offers have more trade than any equilibrium with public offers; under some additional conditions we show Pareto-dominance of the private-offers equilibria. If a failure to trade by the deadline results in an efficiency loss, public offers can induce a market breakdown before the deadline, while trade never stops with private offers.

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