Should Auctions Be Transparent

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2010

• Venue

  Social Science Research Network

• Publication date

  2010-08-12

• Fields of study

  Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.2139/SSRN.2493132
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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