We study the effect of constraints on chiefs' power on economic outcomes, citizens' attitudes, and social capital. A paramount chief in Sierra Leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by British colonial authorities. In chiefdoms with fewer ruling families, chiefs face less political competition, and development outcomes are significantly worse today. Variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism. Paradoxically, with fewer ruling families, the institutions of chiefs' authority are more highly respected, and measured social capital is higher. We argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs.
Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone
D. Acemoglu,T. Reed,James A. Robinson
Published 2014 in Journal of Political Economy
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2014
- Venue
Journal of Political Economy
- Publication date
2014-04-01
- Fields of study
Economics, Political Science
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-97 of 97 references · Page 1 of 1