A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger*

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2000

• Venue

  Journal law and economy

• Publication date

  2000-10-01

• Fields of study

  Business, Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1086/467459
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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