Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  1986

• Venue

  Journal of Public Economics

• Publication date

  1986-10-01

• Fields of study

  Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90071-X
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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