Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement

We consider a model where each agent has an outside option of privately known value. At a given allocation, we call the set of agents who do not exercise their outside options the “participants.” We show that one strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism weakly Pareto-improves another if and only if, at each preference profile, it weakly expands (in terms of set inclusion) the set of participants. Corollaries include: a sufficient condition for a mechanism to be on the Pareto-efficient frontier of strategy-proof mechanisms; uniqueness of strategy-proof Pareto-improvements under true preferences over certain normatively meaningful benchmark allocation rules; and a characterization of the pivotal mechanism.

• Publication year

  2019

• Venue

  Journal of Economics Theory

• Publication date

  2019-05-01

• Fields of study

  Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/J.JET.2019.01.004
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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