GROVES' SCHEME ON RESTRICTED DOMAINS

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  1979

• Venue

  Econometrica

• Publication date

  1979-09-01

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.2307/1911954
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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