Rents, Competition, and Corruption

A. Ades,R. Tella

Published 1999 in The American Economic Review

ABSTRACT

Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    1999

  • Venue

    The American Economic Review

  • Publication date

    1999-09-01

  • Fields of study

    Economics, Political Science

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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