Die Theorie globaler Spiele: Private Information als Mittel zur Vermeidung multipler Gleichgewichte

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2005

• Venue

  Journal für Betriebswirtschaft

• Publication date

  2005-09-01

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/S11301-005-0017-9
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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