Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2002

• Venue

  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft

• Publication date

  2002-06-01

• Fields of study

  Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1628/0932456022975394
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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