We study loss aversion in majority voting. First, we show a status quo bias. Second, loss aversion implies a moderating effect. Third, in a dynamic setting, the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters; however, in the presence of a projection bias, majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt. Fourth, in a stochastic environment, loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk, but also a smaller attachment to the status quo. The application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications.
Loss Aversion in Politics
A. Alesina,Francesco Passarelli
Published 2019 in American Journal of Political Science
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- Publication year
2019
- Venue
American Journal of Political Science
- Publication date
2019-06-21
- Fields of study
Economics, Political Science
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