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A distributional and dynamic theory of pricing and preference.

Peter D. Kvam,J. Busemeyer

Published 2020 in Psychology Review

ABSTRACT

Theories that describe how people assign prices and make choices are typically based on the idea that both of these responses are derived from a common static, deterministic function used to assign utilities to options. However, preference reversals-where prices assigned to gambles conflict with preference orders elicited through binary choices-indicate that the response processes underlying these different methods of evaluation are more intricate. We address this issue by formulating a new computational model that assumes an initial bias or anchor that depends on type of price task (buying, selling, or certainty equivalents) and a stochastic evaluation accumulation process that depends on gamble attributes. To test this new model, we investigated choices and prices for a wide range of gambles and price tasks, including pricing under time pressure. In line with model predictions, we found that price distributions possessed stark skew that depended on the type of price and the attributes of gambles being considered. Prices were also sensitive to time pressure, indicating a dynamic evaluation process underlying price generation. The model out-performed prospect theory in predicting prices and additionally predicted the response times associated with these prices, which no prior model has accomplished. Finally, we show that the model successfully predicts out-of-sample choices and that its parameters allow us to fit choice response times as well. This price accumulation model therefore provides a superior account of the distributional and dynamic properties of price, leveraging process-level mechanisms to provide a more complete account of the valuation processes common across multiple methods of eliciting preference. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

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