Speed up Automated Mechanism Design by Sampling Worst-Case Profiles: An Application to Competitive VCG Redistribution Mechanism for Public Project Problem

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2017

• Venue

  Prima

• Publication date

  2017-10-30

• Fields of study

  Computer Science, Engineering

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-69131-2_8
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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