Stability and change in nuclear thinking: Grand strategy, nuclear weapons, and policy change

ABSTRACT What explains when states shift how they understand the utility of their nuclear weapons? Existing literature offers mechanisms that should be expected to inhibit change, but does not offer an explanation for when those mechanisms might be overcome. I argue that in periods of grand strategic change – when a state’s political-military strategy is in flux – the forces inhibiting shifts of nuclear thinking are more likely to be overcome. Grand strategic change, therefore, may be a necessary condition for changes in nuclear thinking. I examine the cases of the United States and South Africa at the end of the Cold War. My argument offers a plausible explanation for the different outcomes observed: the failed efforts to shift U.S. thinking in the Clinton administration and the South African decision to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. The argument has implications for our understanding of the role that nuclear weapons play in international politics and current policy debates.

• Publication year

  2025

• Venue

  The Journal of Strategic Studies

• Publication date

  2025-03-24

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1080/01402390.2025.2478253
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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