Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2006

• Venue

  Journal of Public Economics

• Publication date

  2006-05-01

• Fields of study

  Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2005.05.001
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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