Monetary Policy by Committee : Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority ?

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2010

• Venue

  Unknown venue

• Publication date

  2010-02-01

• Fields of study

  Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1162/QJEC.2010.125.1.363
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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