Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work

While the theoretical literature on contracts has been enormous since the seventies, empirical tests of the theory have long remained scarce. However, new empirical work has been developed in the last ten years that sheds light on the empirical validation of the theory. This paper aims at surveying the recent empirical work on contracts. The focus throughout is on the need to properly account for unobserved heterogeneity.

• Publication year

  2002

• Venue

  Social Science Research Network

• Publication date

  2002-06-01

• Fields of study

  Economics, History

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511610240.005
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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