Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2006

• Venue

  Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

• Publication date

  2006-05-08

• Fields of study

  Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1145/1160633.1160729
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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